The Measure of Civilizations by Smith, Barry
  1
The Measure of Civilizations 
Barry Smith1 
 
Preprint version of “The Measure of Civilizations”, Academic Questions, 16: 1 (2002/03), 
16–22.  
 
 
Is it possible to compare civilizations one with another? Is it possible, in other words, to 
construct some neutral and objective framework in terms of which we could establish in what 
respects one civilization might deserve to be ranked more highly than its competitors? Morality 
will surely provide one axis of such a framework (and we note in passing that believers in Islam 
might quite reasonably claim that their fellow-believers are characteristically more moral than 
are many in the West). Criteria such as material well-being will need to play a role, too, as also 
will happiness or pleasure (and again we note that it is not clear a priori that there is more 
happiness in the West than there is in other civilizations). We cannot, therefore, expect to be able 
to formulate some single criterion, which would enable us to rank civilizations in a simple 
unilinear order. Even happiness (pace some proponents of the utilitarian philosophy) comes in 
different types, and to count in the civilization stakes the happiness involved would presumably 
need to be of the right kind. Thus it is not clear that happiness derived from, say, taking drugs or 
torturing small animals is going to be able to count in favor of a civilization as much as, say, 
happiness derived from reading poetry.  
 
Balch’s Paradox 
In addressing the idea of an objective framework for evaluating civilizations we are of course 
addressing also the problem of relativism – the problem of whether good and bad, better and 
worse, in this or in that respect, can be applied to civilizations or cultures taken as a whole. Does 
this not presuppose what some, disparagingly, like to call the "God's eye perspective"? Most 
people go through their lives without even once considering problems such as this. They are, in 
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the relativism stakes, simply neutral – they do not care. Among those who do care there are at the 
extremes two groups. On the one hand are the standard-bearers of relativism, a group which 
consists of bad French philosophers, many members of the Modern Languages Association, most 
undergraduates entering American colleges and universities, and (ex officio) the lawyers of Larry 
Flint and Bill Clinton. On the other hand there are the enemies of relativism, a no less motley 
group, which consists of Jerry Falwell, the Pope, believers in Islam, and the members of the 
National Assocation of Scholars. I am going to focus my attentions primarily on the last two 
constituencies mentioned: on believers in Islam, because they will serve as a handy foil for the 
representatives of the West in the discussions to follow, and on members of the NAS, because I 
take them to be among the more articulate standard-bearers of what I am here, somewhat loosely, 
calling ‘Western civilization.’  
 
To make bedfellows of these two groups is not so unreasonable as might first appear. There are, 
after all, a number of respects in which members of the NAS ought to feel quite comfortable with 
Islamic universities. The latter are marked by a genuine respect for venerable traditions. Their 
curricula are mercifully free of programs in (say) lefthanded oppression studies, and they are 
free, too, of commencement speeches by Goldie Hawn. Islamic universities are, surely, valiant 
defenders of the values of truth and justice. Their students, by all accounts, take their studies 
seriously, and they have a healthy regard for the distinction between what is true and what is 
false. They believe in objective morality and they are surely more moral in practice than are 
many of the students in contemporary American universities. But still, many of us will feel that 
there is something missing from Islamic universities. As a first hypothesis we might suggest that 
the wrong people are in charge, and that the wrong doctrines are being imposed. But consider the 
following thought-experiment. Imagine that President Balch and the Board of Directors of the 
NAS have been placed in charge of the Umm Al-Qura University and that they have issued 
instructions to faculty explaining exactly what and how they are to teach. Imagine that the right 
educational values have in this way been imposed from above. Would this solve the problem? 
 
This is what might be called Balch's Paradox. On the one hand the NAS wants faculty members 
to do the right thing. We want universities to be operated according to the principles of the NAS. 
At the same time we want people to do the right thing of their own free will. But which would 
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we prefer: A university system realizing all the values of academic freedom in the familiar 
Western sense, but overrun by relativists and English professors? Or a university system full of 
people doing genuinely valuable scholarly work in the spirit of objective truth and clarity of 
expression – but only because Ayatollah Balch has commanded them to do so? For me, at least, 
the choice is clear – and this is in spite of the fact that I am entirely convinced that the spreading 
of relativism and of the currently fashionable nonsense of the English departments is pernicious 
through and through. 
 
The Utility of Freedom 
Why do we want people to do the right thing of their own free will? One reason might be the 
practical one advanced already by Mill as part of his defense of the freedom of speech. We 
cannot know in advance what the correct answer to any given hard problem might be. We  
therefore leave people the freedom to advance as many alternative answers as possible, even at 
the risk of all manner of craziness and dross. Their efforts are then in sum more likely to yield 
results closer to the truth than would those achieved under more constrained conditions. But then 
we can modify our thought-experiment in such a way as to set this pragmatic factor out of 
account. We can imagine that the authority and wisdom, not to speak of the divine inspiration, of 
Ayatollah Balch are so great that he is able to make the faculty in Mecca find exactly the right 
answers to important questions of science and scholarship at his mere command.  
 
Even this (I hope it is clear) would not suffice: we (in the West) want people to do the right thing 
of their own free will. But why? One reason, in the case in hand, might have to do with the needs 
of evidence gathering and epistemic justification. If people come to these or those results freely, 
then this provides independent support for the validity of these results. It gives us extra reason to 
think that they are true. This cannot be the whole story, however, for our intuition to the effect 
that there is something intrinsically better about people doing the right thing of their own free 
will, rather than at the command of Balch, holds quite generally – it applies to human actions of 
all sorts – and not just in the realm of evidence and knowledge.  
 
A further problem turns on the fact that, while the intrinsic value of freedom comes close to 
being a self-evident truth for us in the West, it seems not to be self-evident to all human beings. 
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Saddam Hussein is well pleased when his people celebrate his birthday in glorious pomp merely 
because they have been commanded to do so. He seems to set no store by the fact that something 
is done freely; and the same is true, it seems, for very many tyrants and despots, both large and 
small. Moreover, letting freedom take its course can of course lead also to bad consequences –  
something which makes it very easy for some to argue that freedom is not an unalloyed good and 
thus that it needs to be constrained. We cannot, therefore, say that the West is best at least in this 
respect: that it has more freedom, or more respect for freedom, than this or that other civilization, 
because views differ from civilization to civilization on the issue of whether freedom is an 
intrinsic value.  
 
The Papal Revolution 
How, then, are we to exploit the factor of freedom as part of our efforts to establish a neutral 
framework for the evaluation of civilizations? To answer this question we need to go back in 
time to the point where the Western world – which at this time means: the world of Western 
Christendom – is facing what we might call the Y1K Problem. The millennium has passed and – 
contrary to expectations nurtured by the Church – Jesus has not returned to Earth. The Church 
responds to the resultant widespread anger and consternation by establishing, slowly but surely, a 
new view of the role of Church in its relation to earthly powers, a view according to which the 
reason why Jesus has not returned to Earth is because the Earth is not yet good enough for him. It 
is, accordingly, a sacred task of mankind here on Earth, a task to be undertaken under the 
authority of the Pope to help make the Earth a better place, that it might be deserving of Christ’s 
return.  
 
This new conception represented a fateful step in the history of the Church and of the Western 
civilization which it did so much to shape and nurture. For it meant that your actions here on 
Earth, your contributions to improving the lot of mankind – for example through the founding of 
universities or of monastic orders – can be of importance for your salvation in heaven. This set in 
train a thousand-year development whose late phases are documented by Max Weber in his The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. This is a development by which some other 
civilizations were for a long time marked unsystematically at best, but which has extended itself 
geographically over time above all through the impact of Western models.   
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The significance of the proposition to the effect that your life on Earth can have meaning 
accordingly extends not just to the West, where it has become entrenched in the very sinews of 
our souls, but to humanity in general.  We in the West came to the realization that life here on 
Earth can have meaning for religious reasons of a quite specific sort. But the core of this thesis 
can be taken also independently of these religious reasons. And in this form, I suggest, it can be 
used as one further criterion by which to measure civilizations.  
 
The Meaning of Life 
But what is the meaning of life? What makes your life worth living? Happiness, some will say. 
But suppose you can have all the happiness you like by taking special pills or drinking just the 
right amounts of vodka? Perhaps love is what makes for a meaningful life. But falling in love, 
wonderful though it may be, is just an event, a threshold between two phases of your existence, 
and it is how you and your loved one shape your new lives together that matters for 
meaningfulness, and this means that you each still need to decide what to do next with your 
lives. Knowledge, for similar reasons, does not make a life worth living. Imagine that you could 
take a pill and immediately become as knowledgeable as the world’s leading expert in quantum 
mechanics. You would still need to decide what to do with your new-found knowledge. And 
similarly if you suddenly become very rich: you would still need to work out what to do with 
your new-found riches.  
 
What makes a life worth living is, accordingly, not happiness, not love, not knowledge, not 
riches. Rather it has something to do with what you do, here on Earth. A meaningful life is a life 
upon which some sort of pattern has been imposed – a pattern which relates not merely to what 
goes on inside your head but which involves also, in serious ways, your having an effect upon 
the world. Beethoven, Mohammed, Alekhine, Farraday all led meaningful lives, according to this 
criterion, because in giving shape to their own lives they also shaped the world around them.  
 
But now it is crucially important that to contribute to meaningfulness this imposed shape or 
pattern must be the result of your efforts and of your free decision. We have here the beginnings 
of an argument why freedom can serve, alongside morality, happiness, and material well-being, 
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as a scale with which to measure civilizations. If you want to lead a meaningful life, then this 
means that you yourself have to decide how to shape your life and how to shape the world in 
which you live. This shape must be non-trivial – it should consist in more than just getting drunk 
every day. This means that it must involve genuine and coherently directed effort, and this means 
in turn that this effort must be directed and callibrated in relation to some independent standards 
of success and failure, standards which could be applied, in principle, by other people. A 
meaningful life is a life which consists in your making and realizing what are for you ambitious 
and difficult plans, plans in relation to which there exist genuine measures of success and 
therefore also the risk of failure.  
  
Doctors lead meaningful lives, and so also do physicists and architects. Baseball players and 
opera-singers lead meaningful lives, and so also do horse-trainers and the members of the 
International Judo Federation. For in all these cases there are measures of success and failure 
which can easily be applied, in the light of day, and which are well-callibrated against the 
amount of care, effort and skill that is invested in the corresponding achievements. 
 
Notice that this definition makes the meaning of your life something objective. You may lead a 
meaningful life without knowing it or without caring about it. But equally, you may think you 
lead a meaningful life when in fact you do not do so. Suppose that you are an ambitious young 
artist. You have a successful career; your paintings are exhibited regularly because they sell very 
well. In fact, however, they are being bought by your rich uncle who has taken pity on you 
because you are such a bad painter. You think you lead a meaningful life, but you are mistaken. 
Whether you lead a meaningful life depends in every case not on your, or other people’s, beliefs 
or feelings, but on what you do, on what you achieve, and thus on the degree to which through 
your efforts you succeed in imposing a pattern on your life and on the world around you. A 
meaningful life, in short, is a life which rests on honest achievement. 
 
Businesspeople, too, lead meaningful lives, the success of their efforts being callibrated by the 
public measure of profit and loss. Moreover, they lead meaningful lives in no small part by 
providing the resources and possibilities which enable others to lead meaningful lives in their 
turn. They help others to realize their goals and they create the systems and tools which allow ever 
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more complex plans to be realized by others. We in the modern world hereby benefit from a 
virtuous cycle: individuals and institutions compete with each other, hereby promoting an end 
which is no part of their intention, to find ever new ways of helping people to make their lives 
ever more meaningful.  
 
Conclusions 
I would like, therefore, to propose that in addition to morality, material well-being, and 
happiness, we accept also degree of conduciveness to the leading of meaningful lives as a factor 
to be weighed in the balance when evaluating civilizations. Rather than explore the results of 
applying this idea to the actual task of weighing one civilization against another, let me conclude by 
turning the somewhat easier task of weighing developments in our institutions of higher education in 
America today.  
 
Institutions and their policies and programs, too, can be measured by their degree of conduciveness 
to the leading of meaningful lives among those who participate in them. That universities have 
through time served as instruments which can facilitate the leading of more meaningful lives on the 
part of the students who attend them is I hope clear. The liberal arts are called ‘liberal’ precisely 
because they serve the end of training free human beings – in contrast to the artes illiberales, 
which are pursued for economic purposes. The aim of liberal education is to prepare the student 
for the pursuit of higher things. Universities are – in principle at least – able to create the conditions 
in which students can learn to measure themselves against hard tasks and acquire the tools and 
options for the making of more complex and ambitious and courageous plans. Universities can teach 
their students to live their lives as free beings conscious of the values of truth and honesty, effort and 
diligence. But this will be so only to the degree that universities themselves impose stringent 
conditions of grading on merit and embrace a conception of their mission as one that is devoted to 
the pursuit of truth under conditions of free and open inquiry. Especially in the natural sciences much 
of this callibration is still preserved. The SAT, GRE and other standardized tests are (still) among the 
glories of the American system of higher education (and are in no small part responsible for the 
qualitative superiority of American universities over their European counterparts – one reason why 
the British Government is currently looking into the possibility of introducing the SAT as a 
replacement for its current, failed system of university admissions examinations).  
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It almost goes without saying, however, that the callibration of our universities towards the ends of 
respect for merit, fairness and truth has in other respects been eroded considerably in recent times. 
Relativism predominates not just in the untutored thinking of our undergraduates, who assume that 
the idea of truth is in some way incompatible with the idea of tolerance for others’ views; it 
predominates also on the side of many of their professors, where it has infected entire disciplines 
hitherto dedicated to venerable forms of inquiry.  
 
Perhaps the saddest developments are those documented by Alan Kors and Harvey Silverglade in 
their book The Shadow University. To lead a meaningful life it helps if you live in an environment in 
which the right sorts of consequences follow from your actions – a society in which you are rewarded 
for doing the right thing and punished for doing the wrong thing, so that your activities are structured 
in relation to the right sorts of measures of success applied fairly and in the light of day. As Kors and 
Silverglade show, almost everyone involved in contemporary universities is subject to a system in 
which what goes on behind the scenes is entirely at variance with the noble goals which are 
promulgated before the public. It is a system in which constantly the wrong signals are sent to 
students as to the relation between achievement and reward. It is a system in which whole arms of the 
university are dedicated to the task of teaching students not to act as free individuals but rather to 
conform to what is expected of them (politically) as members of specific groups.  
 
English departments remain politicized, and their graduates are systematically politicizing the 
teaching of English in high schools and elsewhere. But there are also signs of hope, as the work of 
the NAS, FIRE and other such bodies makes clear, and we can comfort ourselves with the thought 
that those of us who work in universities are currently faced with many opportunities to add meaning 
to our own lives precisely by helping to create the conditions for whole generations of students to 
lead meaningful lives in the future.2 
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